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Water sharing, reciprocity, and need: A comparative study of interhousehold water 
transfers in sub-Saharan Africa 
Abstract  
Water sharing between households could crucially mitigate short-term household water 
shortages, yet it is a vastly understudied phenomenon. Here we use comparative survey 
data from eight sites in seven sub-Saharan African countries (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda) to answer three questions: 
With whom do households share water? What is expected in return? And what roles do 
need and affordability play in shaping those transfers? We find that water is shared 
predominantly between neighbors, that transfers are more frequent when water is less 
available and less affordable, and that most sharing occurs with no expectation of direct 
payback. These findings identify water sharing, as a form of generalized reciprocity, to be a 
basic and consistent household coping strategy against shortages and unaffordability of 
water in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Introduction  
Water is increasingly scarce and commodified. Across the globe, 4 billion people now 
experience severe water scarcity for at least one month of the year (Mekonnen and 
Hoekstra 2016). While household water need can be related to aridity or physical water 
scarcity, in contemporary societies it is additionally created by poor water governance, 
unreliable provision and maintenance, social marginality, lack of political power, lack of 
resources, and other aspects of living in poverty (Bakker 2010; Jepson et al. 2017; 
Swyngedouw 2013). Community pooling has been, historically, a widely practiced 
institutional strategy across the globe for managing scarce water resources for collective 
benefit at the local level (Guillet 1992; Lansing 1987; Scarborough 1998). To cope with 
water insecurities, vulnerable communities self-organize through such means as pooling 
money or labor to safeguard and allocate new water sources (e.g., digging wells or 
building a tap stand system) or by exerting governance rules around existing water 
sources to distribute water across households more equitably and consistently (Ostrom 
1990). 
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However, such common pool water also can transform into a private good. For example, 
when people collect or buy water for their own household use, it may then be seen as 
belonging to the person or household that collected or purchased it, regardless of its 
provenance. As such, another potential form of coping with water shortfalls is the direct 
sharing of such private water between households; in other words, the acts of giving or 
receiving water from one household to another as gifts, loans, exchanges, or sales (Wutich 
and Brewis 2014; Wutich et al. 2018), sometimes operationally referred to as transfers. By 
household water sharing, we are referring to transfers of water between households 
designed to meet daily needs inside the receiving household (i.e., drinking, cooking, 
sanitation, washing clothes, cleaning, and bathing, but not maintaining livestock or crops). 
These transfers can be viewed as a kind of gift giving, with a potentially wide range of 
expectations of payback or reciprocity (Mauss [1924] 2002). 
Following Sahlins (1972), we are particularly interested in understanding if expectations of 
reciprocity are better described as generalized reciprocity (with no expectation of direct or 
immediate payback) or balanced reciprocity (with a clear expectation of some form of 
payback on a relative short time scale). Social scientists have previously documented 
interhousehold water transfers occurring within low-resource communities in rural Ethiopia 
(Maes et al. 2018), Malawi (Adams 2017; Velzeboer, Hordijk, and Schwartz 2017), Sudan 
(Zug 2014; Zug and Graefe 2014), Uganda (Pearson et al. 2015), and Tanzania 
(Nganyanyuka et al. 2014). 
A recent review proposes that such transfers should emerge with consistency in water-
insecure environments, and this may reflect a broader strategy to mitigate some of the 
effects of managing unsafe, intermittent, or insufficient local water sources (Wutich et al. 
2018). Yet, the lack of systematic documentation of water sharing practices as they occur 
across diverse sites means it is difficult, on the basis of the current empirical evidence, to 
theorize better what those might be and how they might mitigate resource risks (like water 
unaffordability). By comparison, there is good cross-cultural evidence that inter household 
food sharing (and, to some extent, labor sharing) emerges consistently under conditions of 
resource shortages, and that the greater the shortage, the more sharing that occurs 
(Ember et al. 2018). 
Here we present an empirical, comparative, cross-cultural study designed to provide 
much-needed basic substantiation regarding how some key proximate household 
economic (e.g., water need/affordability) and social (e.g., cultural norms) factors shape 
household water sharing. Given the fundamental lack of existing theoretical literature 
explaining household water sharing as a practice to mitigate such water stresses, we 
begin with three key questions to organize our analysis: With whom do households share 
water? What is expected in return? And what role does need and unaffordability play in 
shaping those transfers? Our answers and resulting theory building are based on the 
systematic comparison of eight socially and economically distinct communities from across 
sub-Saharan Africa. Our research sites are characterized by significant rainfall seasonality, 
high levels of material poverty, weak water infrastructures, and other water-supply 
challenges. We chose the region to baseline test propositions regarding the general 
principles of how and why households share private water because many of the existing 
case reports of interhousehold water sharing events noted above are from this region. 
We began our effort to clarify water sharing with a key question: why would people in 
water-insecure communities share household-owned water at all, especially when they 
themselves may also have need?The limited water sharing literature is not especially clear 
on this point (Wutich et al. 2018). Economic anthropologists, working from both 
sociocultural and evolutionary perspectives, though, have provided a variety of reasonable 
answers, particularly from studies of food sharing, that could be relevant. From research in 
behavioral ecology on food sharing in subsistence societies, we can posit, for example, 
that givers and receivers may set up a “tit-for-tat” reciprocal arrangement in which one 
provides water to the other at one time in exchange for a return gift at some point in the 
future (Axelrod 1984; Trivers 1971). In Namibia, for example, Schnegg and Linke (2015) 
found that people maintain complex networks that include noncommensurate exchanges 
of food and other goods, including water. But not all household trading partners are equal, 
and a further basic expectation drawn from the food sharing literature would be that kin 
(especially genetic kin) would be favored in transfers over affines (relatives by marriage), 
and both would be favored over friends and neighbors (Hamilton 1964, as discussed in 
Gurven 2004 on kin; see also Hruschka 2010). Family members are viewed generally as 
more reliable and trustworthy sharing partners, so they could be favored in “tit-for-tat” just 
for the reason of higher expectation of later reciprocity (Allen-Arave, Gurven, and Hill 
2008). Such favor could take the form of both higher frequencies of transfers and lower 
expectations of exchange/return. For example, water kiosk attendants in informal 
settlements of Lilongwe, Malawi, were observed to routinely offer free water (illegally) to 
their family members or people with whom they shared close ties (Adams, Juran, and 
Ajibade 2018).Thus we propose the following: 
Proposition 1:Water sharing transfers will occur more frequently between closely related 
kin. 
Proposition 2: Transfers are more likely to have no direct expectation of direct payback 
(i.e., generalized reciprocity) when they are between kin. 
There is also a relevant growing literature regarding the role of generosity (Barnard and 
Woodburn 1988) and norms, often referred to as a moral economy, that is potentially 
relevant to water sharing (Trawick 2001; Wutich 2011). This includes the expectation to 
help those in need, and is especially evident in subsistence societies (e.g., Scott 1976). 
Such norms may dictate the giving of water to those who suffer from thirst or other 
immediate water needs (Wutich and Brewis 2014).Water sharing norms, which may be 
situated in religious communities and beliefs or other factors, have been described for 
contexts as varied as Syria and Saudi Arabia (Musil 1928), Tanzania (Smiley 2013), 
Bangladesh (Sultana 2011), and Bolivia (Wutich 2011). 
Another possibility is that the donors and recipients who engage in water sharing events 
are engaged in risk-pooling relationships, whereby those who happen in that moment to 
have abundant resources give to those who are in need, reflecting the shared 
understanding that the future of one’s resource acquisitions and holdings is unpredictable 
(Cronk et al., forthcoming; Velzeboer, Hordijk, and Schwartz 2017). In the case of water, 
such an arrangement would make sense if there were unpredictability as to which sharing 
party would be successful in obtaining water and which would not (e.g.,Wiessner 
1986;Wutich 2011); that is, related to unpredictability in each household’s ability to access, 
afford, or transport water, rather than unpredictability in the overall availability of the 
resource. A further explanation is that people will share water because doing so serves as 
a sign of both their ability to acquire resources and their generosity, an idea common to 
both the theory of indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987) and costly signaling theory (Smith 
and Bliege Bird 2005). Last, people may trade water for the simple, immediate reason of 
profit or cash earnings. In other words, water is seen as a commodity with a price, just as 
one might charge or request reimbursement from others for any private good. 
Household economics—specifically need itself—should also theoretically matter greatly for 
shaping decisions around water transfers.Water sharing can thus be broadly approached 
as a coping strategy in the face of economic constraints–without losing sight of the 
importance of inequality—including in access to water, negotiating power, and household 
economic inequalities. This perspective can sit comfortably with varied forms of generosity 
and moral economies. For example, wealthier households might share water with those in 
greatest need to build political capital or to reinforce patron–client dependencies (i.e., 
perform self-interested charity) (Wutich et al. 2018). In this vein, Pearson et al.’s (2015) 
observations in three rural Ugandan villages noted that wealthier, higher-status 
households tended to gift water to the poorer and lowest ones (who were more likely to be 
forced to purchase water). 
In this arrangement, households in the middle were mostly excluded. Alternatively, in 
Bolivian squatter settlements, Jewell and Wutich (2011) observed that the most severely 
water-deprived households sometimes withdrew from requesting water from others if they 
thought any later reciprocity might be expected (Wutich and Ragsdale 2008). Because 
worry of having to repay after accepting water is a demonstrated stressor, we need to 
better test if it is really the case that the most extreme need leads to the high densities of 
water sharing.Thus we propose the following: 
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Proposition 3: Both need for water and unaffordability of water will predict a greater rate of 
interhousehold water transfers. 
Proposition 4: Householdswith higher socioeconomic status (SES)within communities will 
transfer preferentially to households with lower SES and will be more likely to do so 
without an expectation of direct payback (i.e., generalized reciprocity). 
Study details 
The data analyzed herein are drawn from the HouseholdWater Insecurity Experiences 
(HWISE) study.The initial round of data collection included household survey 
implementation at eight different sites across sub-Saharan Africa, with a target sample of 
250 households at each site (Table 1).The selected study sites span an array of urban, 
periurban, and rural settings. All sites experience various forms, degrees, and etiologies of 
water insecurity, for example seasonality, infrastructure, or service challenges (see Tables 
1 and 2). The forms of water transfer vary across the locations but mostly involve relatively 
modest amounts that can be carried. For example, in the Ugandan site, in-home piped 
water is unavailable. Household water must be collected in a jerry can from a public 
borehole, a surface water source, or (more rarely) a water vendor. Water transfers across 
households thus typically involve handing over one or more jerry cans of water or 
permitting other households to fill jerry cans from a pond or stream on a household’s 
private property. At the Malawi site, private household taps are rare, and water collection 
involves walking to either a water vendor or a public standpipe.Water is then stored within 
the household in barrels or large basins to guard against intermittent supply and sudden 
breaks in the distribution system. Water transfers across households typically involve 
giving away one or more bucketsful of water from this stored supply. Transfers can also 
take the form of more affluent households with their own taps allowing poorer households 
to take buckets of water from the tap at no cost. Data collection at each site was managed 
by social scientists (mostly trained as anthropologists and cultural geographers), each with 
long-term experience at that particular site.1 Verbal informed consent was obtained at the 
beginning of all interviews by a trained enumerator. Individual site principal 
investigators’ (PIs’) home institutions or Northwestern University (central manager) 
provided the institutional review board of record for the sites. Furthermore, ethical approval 
was obtained as required from the appropriate local or national in-country institutions. 
Systematic random sampling was used to select households for participation, except in 
Kahemba, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the survey was implemented 
within an ongoing intervention study that utilized a purposive sampling technique (Table 1). 
Adults who described themselves as knowledgeable about the household’s water situation 
were considered eligible to participate. Surveys were administered in the relevant local 
language. 
Table 1 here  
Topics included questions on sociodemographics, water acquisition, treatment, and water 
storage. In terms of water sharing, the respondent in each household was asked “In the 
last four weeks/month, how frequently have you or anyone in your household asked to 
borrow water from other people? From whom? What was expected in return?” and “In the 
last four weeks/one month, how frequently have you or anyone in your household loaned 
water to anyone?” To understand who shares with whom, we coded open-ended 
responses into relationship distance categories (i.e., family, friends, neighbors, etc.). 
Where people nominated multiplex ties (e.g., neighboring family member), we coded for 
the closer relationship (e.g., family member over neighbor). Level of absolute household 
need for water was estimated based on four factors—(a) reported frequency of no water 
whatsoever in the household, (b) worry about not having enough water, (c) interruption of 
water supply, and (d) not enough water as would like to drink in the last four weeks—on a 
5-point scale ranging from 0 (never [0 times]) to 4 (always [more than 20 times]) then 
summed (range 0–14, mean 2.6Å}3). We then created an ordinal variable using natural 
breaks in the data to define cut points, so that none=0 (24% of observations), low=1–3 
(30%), medium=4–6 (25%), and high=7–14 (21%). A measure of absolute household 
water unaffordability was derived from reporting frequencies of lacking money to buy water 
(never, rarely, sometimes, often, always), reporting of frequencies of money concerns 
about water, monthly spending on securing water as a percentage of total household 
income (in USD), and level of reported household food insecurity (using theHousehold 
Food Insecurity Access Scale; see Coates et al. 2007). A single component was extracted 
through principal components analysis, explaining 52.5% of variation (see Table 2 for 
variation by site). To consider relative perceived SES, respondents were asked to point to 
a rung on a ladder to indicate their household’s relative socioeconomic standing compared 
to others in their local community.  
The scores ranged from 1 (highest standing) to 10 (lowest standing). To allow Water 
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sites, we converted these site-specific measures to quintiles within each site (with 1 being 
the lowest perceived SES quintile and 5 the highest). Descriptive analyses were 
conducted in SPSS version 24. For predictive modeling, multiple logistic regression 
models were used since our outcome variables (giving water, receiving water, and 
expectation of return) were dichotomous. These models, when estimates are 
exponentiated, provide odds ratios (OR). All regression models were estimated using Stata 
Version 15.0 and included the following covariates: rural versus urban/periurban, 
household size, time spent collecting water each week (greater vs. less than one hour per 
day on average), amount of drinking and total water stored in the household, and whether 
the main household water supply was being purchased at the time of data collection (e.g., 
tanker truck, bottled water). These covariates were selected a priori based on documented 
factors that affect water availability and needs within households, which may affect the 
giving and receiving of water (Gleick 1996;WorldHealth Organization 2017). Our 
independent variables of interest, fitted into the separate models, were whether recipients 
of transfers were kin, household water need score, water unaffordability score, and relative 
SES quintiles. We used variance inflation factor (VIF) to assess potential multicollinearity 
present within regression models. All covariates had VIF lower than 10, indicating that 
multicollinearity was not significantly affecting the estimates (Wooldridge 2015). 
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We accounted for clustering across the eight sub-Saharan sites in two ways. First, we 
used a fixed-effect estimation technique to account for site-level differences since we had 
insufficient sample size at our macro-level unit (i.e., sites, N <25), and the sites themselves 
were not chosen at random from all possible sites in sub-Saharan Africa (Möhring 2012; 
Wooldridge 2015). Using hierarchical regression modeling in this situation may result in 
omitted variable bias regarding the site-level estimators. Therefore, using a fixed effect for 
our macro-level unit, we dealt with this issue by controlling for site-level heterogeneity and 
removing variation at the site level. Second, we employed cluster-adjusted standard errors 
to account for within-cluster (site) correlation, relaxing the independence requirement of 
observations (Wooldridge 2015). 
We note two key limitations of these analyses. While the site samples all involved random 
selection at the household level, three sites also first stratified by clusters (population 
strata, neighborhoods, or towns).This means that our standard errors are underestimated. 
For this reason, we more conservatively selected p<0.01 as our threshold for significance. 
Second, some sites obtained samples above the target of 250 (e.g., DRC at n=392). This 
means that it would be possible that our findings would be biased toward the observations 
at the locations with larger contributing sample sizes. For this reason, we used probability 
weights in the regression modeling described earlier to adjust for sample size within each 
site to the target goal of 250 as the inverse probability that an observation was sampled 
(Korn and Graubard 2011). For example, in the DRC, each observation was weighted as 
1/(392/250)=0.638. 
Results 
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Interhousehold water sharing (i.e., transfers) occurs regularly at all the surveyed sites (see 
Figure 1). Rates of households giving water in the prior four weeks ranged from 6.4% in 
Arua, Uganda, to 66.7% in Kisumu, Kenya (both rural, primarily agriculturalist 
communities). Rates of incoming water transfers (i.e., receiving) ranged from 20.5% in 
urban Accra, Ghana, in the rainy season to 84.8% in rural agropastoralist villages of 
Kahemba, DRC (the site with reportedly the most chronic water shortages of all those 
sampled). 
Water transfer patterns were more evenly balanced in some sites than others, meaning 
that the percentage of households that gave water better balanced those that received 
water (Table 2). While we do not have data that track directly the reciprocity of transfers 
between specific households, the range of lending households that also themselves 
received water in the last four weeks was as low as 32.5% in urban Accra, Ghana, to 
94.8% in Kahemba, DRC. Importantly, Kahemba is also the site with the highest levels of 
giving and receiving and the most balanced and getting “in the last four weeks”, by site. 
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Figure 2 here  
What was expected in return for getting water, as reported by site. pattern of giving and 
receiving. Furthermore, in the site with the lowest rate of households giving water (Arua, 
Uganda, 6.4%), three-quarters of those giving households also reported receiving water 
themselves, another indirect indicator of a reciprocal system in operation. 
Proposition 1: Do households share most frequently with kin? 
Contrary to expectations, the vast majority of extra household transfers in all the sites were 
with nonkin, specifically with neighbors (87% overall, ranging from 52% to 93%; Table 2). 
The highest rates of transfers between kin were in Amhara, Ethiopia (48%), a rural site of 
unbalanced transfers with many more households getting than giving water, and rural 
Arua, Uganda (32.5%), the latter also with relatively high levels of unbalanced transfers 
(i.e., a few households were transferring water to many). 
Proposition 2: Is water sharing with kin more likely to be generalized reciprocity? 
The vast majority of water transfers into households overall (77.3%)were described as 
generalized reciprocity, in that nothing was expected in return (Figure 2). In two sites 
(Lagos, Nigeria, and Kampala, Uganda), some form of payback (i.e., balanced reciprocity) 
was expected more commonly than generalized reciprocity. In Lagos,Nigeria, water was 
expected in return, and in Kampala, Uganda, water or money was expected. Notably, 
reports of expectations of payback for water sharing in forms other than water or money 
(e.g., food, labor) were extremely rare (Figure 2). We then used logistic regression to test if 
transfers with kin were more likely to have no expectation of return (i.e., were generalized 
reciprocity) (Table 3). We found that kin were not significantly different than nonkin in the 
expectation of return of water (p=0.19). However, the relationship was in the expected 
direction, as kin had half (0.49) the odds of expecting something in return for receiving 
water compared to nonkin (95% CI 0.19–1.40, Model 1) adjusting for covariates. 
Proposition 3: Does household water neediness/unaffordability affect sharing? 
We considered how levels of household need for water affect the likelihood of transfers. 
Water need scores were highest on average in Kahemba, DRC (6.3Å}2.9), and lowest in 
Lagos, Nigeria (1.1Å}1.7) (Table 2). The large standard deviations reflect significant within-
site inequalities in need. We tested if households with greater need for water were more 
likely to receive water and if those with lower need for water were more likely to give it 
(Model 2, Table 3). We found strong evidence on both counts, such that as household 
need increased, the odds of receiving and giving water grew in magnitude. Most notably, 
households who reported the highest need for water had nearly 9 (OR 8.8, 95% CI 3.99–
19.4, p<0.001, Model 2a) times the odds of receiving water and 4.5 (OR 4.63; 95% CI 
2.25–9.51, p<0.001,Model 2b) times the odds of giving water to other households, 
compared to those with no reported need for water and adjusting for covariates. 
We used a similar logistic regression model to test if water unaffordability also affected 
who received and gave water (Model 3, Table 3). We found that as water unaffordability 
increased, so did the odds of both giving and receiving water in the past month. 
Specifically, each standard deviation increase in the water unaffordability score was 
associated with 2 (95% CI 1.71–2.32, p<0.001, Model 3a) times the odds of receiving 
water and 1.5 (95% CI 1.23–1.83, p<0.001, Model 3b) times the odds of giving water, 
controlling for covariates. 
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Proposition 4: Does perceived household SES affect sharing? 
Mean perceived SES scores varied across sites, with households in Kahemba, DRC, 
estimating themselves with the worst SES on average (8.0Å}1.6) and those in 
Lagos,Nigeria, with the highest estimates (5.4Å}2.1). Considering data fromacross all the 
sites, lowest quintile SES households within each site had higher reports of receiving 
water within the last month, and the highest two quintiles reported the least. And while the 
sample sizes are small, an apparent trend can be seen among the fourteen respondents 
who reported “frequently” receiving water within the past month: more than half were within 
the lowest quintile, while only two were in the highest. However, households within all SES 
quintiles reported receiving water, and there was no clear linear trend (first [lowest]=26%, 
second=19%,third=22%, fourth=17%, fifth [highest]=17%). Similarly, for water giving, some 
households at all SES quintiles within sites reported doing so (first=22%, second=16.9%, 
third=21%, fourth=19%, fifth=21%), again with no clear linear trend. The third and fifth 
quintiles were most likely to report “always” having given water in the past month. 
However, the lowest quintile was the most likely to report “often” giving, compared to 
others, with 39% giving water—the highest of the frequencies reported. 
Giving and receiving patterns within sites also did not display evident linear trends (Table 
2). In several sites, the middle quintiles were as likely to report having received or given 
water as the lowest or highest quintiles. For example, in Arua, Uganda, the middle quintile 
reported more than double the rate of giving water to other households than any other 
strata (44% of all transfers). In the DRC site, the lowest quintile reported giving water most 
frequently (25% of all transfers). In Accra, Ghana, the lowest and highest quintiles reported 
the highest frequencies of water sharing. 
We used logistic regression models to test if relative perceived household SES status 
within sites predicted both giving and receiving water (Model 4, Table 3). Specifically, we 
considered if households in the top (highest) quintile(s) of perceived status were more 
likely to preferentially transfer water (Model 4) and whether those water transfers were 
made without expectation of payback to the bottom/lower quintiles (Model 5). We found 
that compared to the highest quintile, households in the lowest quintile had 60% higher 
odds of receiving a transfer (OR 1.60, 95% CI 1.20–2.13, p=0.001, Model 4a) in the last 
month. Households in the second lowest and middle SES quintiles also had elevated odds 
of receiving a transfer, but these did not meet our conservative significance cutoff. 
In contrast, providing a transfer was not significantly different by quintile of SES, again due 
to our conservative significance cutoff (Model 4b). Finally, SES status by quintile was not 
associated with providing water without expectation of payback (Model 5). Implications, 
limitations, and next steps We began with four general propositions: that household water 
sharing transfers (a)would favor kin and (b) be more likely to engage in generalized 
reciprocity with kin, (c) that absolute need for water and unaffordability of water predicts 
transfers, and that (d) higher-status households will transfer to lower-status ones (without 
expectations of direct payback). Integrating the findings of our analyses of empirical data 
from eight sub-Saharan African sites provides several key insights relevant to general 
theory building around how proximate economic and social factors help explain household 
water sharing practices. 
A key finding, against prediction, is that the vast majority of sharing events occur between 
neighbors, not kin. This has very significant theoretical implications, as it suggests that the 
key findings about kin preferences in the food-sharing literature (e.g., Gurven 2004; 
Hamilton 1964) are not directly generalizable to water sharing. A parsimonious explanation 
could be that water, compared to such other possible transferable household private 
goods as food, labor, or money, is heavy and hard to move—even to the point of causing 
injuries (Geere et al. 2010). That is, it is harder to move water between households in any 
volume without special transport or infrastructure (e.g., a tanker, pushcart), and the 
difficulty increases sharply with distance. The very high rates of sharing with neighbors 
suggest to us that that the forms of water sharing networks within communities are likely 
driven strongly by propinquity. A second explanation may be that sharing with neighbors 
who are nonkin may help strengthen bonds so that the sharers’ network is larger and they 
may have more people to call on when in need. This then suggests the need for detailed 
case studies on this point. In this study, we do not know the actual amount of A. Brewis et 
al. water being shared, just the frequencies of sharing events. It could be that amounts of 
water given with or without expectation of payback vary between kin and nonkin 
households in important ways (e.g., perhaps transfers between kin are larger in volume 
when they occur, even if they are less frequent). 
Importantly, the vast majority of reported water transfers—including between neighbors—
were described as generalized reciprocity, for which no direct payback was expected.This 
was the same general pattern across low and high-SES households. At some sites, almost 
all transfers took this basic form. This is also consistent with the findings of the “moral 
economy” literature (Scott 1976; Trawick 2001; Wutich 2011) and also the idea that it is 
adaptive to give water to those who need it without any expectation of repayment in 
situations where there is some unpredictability about who will have sufficient water at any 
given time (Cronk et al., forthcoming;Wiessner 1986). 
The unpredictability of such situations makes them similar to the kinds of situations in 
which one might buy an insurance policy. The norms found at many sites may thus be 
proximate cultural instantiations of this more distal adaptive logic of risk pooling through 
transfers to those in need (Aktipis et al. 2016; Cronk et al., forthcoming). In others, 
balanced reciprocity (i.e., direct payback for water) was sometimes expected. The two 
highest of these were both urban settings: in Lagos, Nigeria, almost half of water transfers 
were with an overt expectation of later payback with water in return, and in Kampala, 
Uganda, where one-third of transfers were expected in return. But in Kahemba, DRC, 
where neediness was greatest, only 5% of transfers included any expectation of return. In 
no sites, though, was there significant reporting of any other forms of payback, such as for 
labor or food for water. More detailed studies on this specific point are suggested, perhaps 
particularly comparing how food versus water transfers occur within communities 
struggling with both. Food security often depends on water security, while the converse is 
not true (i.e., you cannot cultivate food nor cook it easily without water). This might help 
explain why norms associated with generalized reciprocity seem to be so widely in effect 
across all these varied sites. 
These data demonstrate, as predicted (following Pearson et al. 2015; Wutich 2011), that 
household economic factors are important in shaping water sharing practices. Overall 
patterns conform to those that would be expected if household sharing were a coping 
strategy to help deal with issues of water need or unaffordability.The site with the highest 
household levels of reported water need and unaffordability (Kahemba, DRC) also has 
both the highest rate of incoming water transfers, which makes sense given data were 
collected in the dry season. Moreover, modeling of data across the sites (with sites as 
fixed effects) confirmed that the odds of both receiving and giving a transfer increased 
substantially with increasing levels of household water need and water unaffordability.  
Notably, however, transfers of water—both giving and receiving—were observable at all 
perceived SES strata.  
As predicted (Wutich et al. 2018), we found a general pattern of more transfers from 
higher-status households to lower-status ones; however, this was not uniformly replicated 
in every community. In some places, the lowest quintile households were given less water 
compared to those in higher quintiles. In other sites, households in the middle SES strata 
(third quintile) included thosemost actively engaged in water transfers.The general 
implication is that water sharing practices transect all social strata in water-scarce 
communities. These findings also indicate that much more detailed case study analysis 
(like that suggested by Pearson et al. 2015) will be needed to understand how inequalities 
in household socioeconomics shape water transfer decisions. 
A few limitations of the current study should be acknowledged. First, although we made an 
effort to capture multiplexity, our models did not include complex operationalizations of 
multiplex ties (e.g., kin who are also neighbors who are also coreligionists).More and 
better-defined research on multiplexity in water sharing is needed (see Schnegg and Linke 
2015 for guidance here). For example, we need to better understand how kinship distance 
and household distance both matter. Second, it is possible that our finding about the 
relatively low rates of water sharing between kin (as compared with neighbors) could be an 
artifact of the way the water sharing questions were asked (i.e., using the terms loan and 
borrow). It is possible that people have unique emic concepts that describe water sharing 
with kin, and we would have received different answers if we had asked about these 
specifically. That said, many people did report water sharing with kin, and there are 
theoretical reasons (related to distance and the weight of water) that make it reasonable 
that neighbors would be preferred water sharing partners.Third, the data were not 
collected at the height of the dry season in most sites, and this may have contributed to 
underestimation of actual water sharing frequencies. Fourth, the concept of “sharing” 
varies across cultures and languages, and—although we made extensive efforts to pretest 
our protocols for cross-cultural equivalence—we cannot be completely sure that our core 
questions were understood in exactly the same way in each site. Finally, and relatedly, the 
high frequency with which water transfers between households are observed in all these 
water-scarce communities and that fewer people than predicted are sharing with their kin 
suggest the possibility of high levels of water sharing associated tensions and conflicts 
(not captured in this study). This is because, although the idea of “sharing” is commonly 
understood as synonymous with largesse, sharing, gift giving, and other resource transfers 
also can be deployed to (re)produce unequal power relationships. Sharing itself, in all its 
forms (gifting, selling, loaning, and so on) can also lead to disputes, as Sultana (2011) 
describes, especially in settings where water conflicts arise through class, power, religious, 
or political differences. We suggest that more detailed ethnographic studies of how 
conflicts around household water sharing systems emerge and are managed between 
households and within communities are a high priority. 
Note 
1 The detailed HWISE data collection manual can be found online at https://doi.org/
10.21985/N2P450. 
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